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INTRODUCTION
The introduction of invasive species is a serious threat to American
wildlife. In 2002, Maryland drew international attention after it
launched a crusade to eradicate northern snakeheads, a nonnative
exotic fishspecies, from several ponds in the state.' A local Mary-
1. Anita Huslin, Snakeheads Slipped a Fatal Dose; Potent Toxin
Nets Scores of Alien Species, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2002 at B01; See
also Judith Person, Snakehead No. 18 Caught in Potomac; 19-inch
Fish Found at Dogue Creek, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004 at B03
[hereinafter Snakehead No. 18; Lee Bergquist, 'Frankenfish'
Cousin Found in State, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 24, 2003 at
IA [hereinafter Frankenfish]. Besides its aggressive disposition,
other factors render snakeheads a particularly onerous threat to
American wildlife:
Native to Asia and Africa, snakehead fish have no natural
predators in the United States and pose significant threats
to native wildlife communities in this country. The ani-
mals are capable of moving short distances on land and
can withstand extreme weather conditions.
Arrest Made for Possession, Sale of Snakehead Fish, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, FEB. 27, 2003 available at 2003 WL 3728408. After the
discovery of more snakeheads in Maryland waters in May of 2004,
the success of Maryland's attempt at eradicating the species is still
uncertain. See Ruinous Fish Out of Lake, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2004
at A19.
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land man dumped two snakeheads into one pond and within two
years over 100 of the extremely voracious fish, which have a seem-
ingly insatiable appetite for other fish, were wreaking havoc in three
area ponds and threatening life in other nearby waterways. 2 Re-
cently, the snakehead a~peared in both a Wisconsin river3 and lakes
in a Philadelphia park. Most worrisome, however, is that by the
summer of 2004, at least eighteen snakeheads were caught along
Maryland's Potomac River or its tributaries, leading some scientists
to believe that the fish is establishing itself in the greater-
Washington D.C. area.5 In response, the federal government recog-
nized the snakehead as a danger to all American wildlife and out-
lawed its importation or interstate transportation nationwide.
6
Such purely federal approaches to combating invasive species,
however, have proved unsuccessful. Though state approaches to
combat invasive species have been more successful, they are insuffi-
cient to address the problem of invasive species. The solution is
federal and state cooperation through enforcement of the Lacey Act.
7
2. Rona Kobell, Snakehead Poisoning Mired in Details; Coordi-
nation Effort Delays Plan to Eradicate Fish, BALT. SUN, Aug. 12,
2002 at lB.
3. See Frankenfish supra note 1.
4. Ramona Smith, Run! Swim! Frankenfish is Here!, PHIL.
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2004 at 10.
5. David A. Fahrenhold & Joshua Partlow, Snakeheads May be
Making Home in Potomac; Fishermen and Scientists Show Mix of
Alarm, Intrigue Over Transplanted Species, WASH. POST, June 30,
2004 at B0 1; See also Patrik Jonsson, 'Frankenfish' and the Hunt for
Invasive Species; A Thriving Newcomer May Threaten Potomac's
Beloved Bass, Sparking a Search-and-Destroy Mission, CHRIST.
SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 19, 2004 at 3; see also Snakehead No. 18,
supra note 1.
6. See 50 C.F.R. § 16.13 (2003); see also U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Import Restrictions on Live Snakehead Fish, Eggs, Is Effec-
tive Friday, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Announces, (October 3,
2002), at http://news.fws.gov/newsreleases/r9/853EiBO9-2BO3-
4BF9-B508CC7A4982DCE5. html.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1988).
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Congress enacted the Lacey Act in 1900,8 to "aid enforcement of
state wildlife laws." 9 Congress recognized that the best way to pro-
tect American wildlife from invasive species is for the federal gov-
ernment to work side-by-side with the states.10 A judge-made
Common law doctrine called the Dormant Commerce Clause, how-
ever, poses a constant threat to state invasive species laws used to
effectuate the purpose of the Lacey Act." Federal and state gov-
ernments lose an important tool in wildlife protection when courts
strike down these state predicate laws under the Dormant Commerce
Clause. Although the Dormant Commerce Clause plays an impor-
tant role protecting interstate commerce from protectionist state leg-
islation, this paper argues that courts should scrutinize state invasive
species laws used as State Invasive Species Lacey Act Predicates.
("SISLAPs") differently than they do state laws affecting interstate
commerce because of the crucial role they play in enforcing the
Lacey Act. Part I of this paper explains the history and content of
the Lacey Act. It also discusses the relationship between the Lacey
Act and state law and the Lacey Act's role in the fight against inva-
sive species. Part II explains the history of the Dormant Commerce
Clause and discusses why the Dormant Commerce Clause applies to
SISLAPs and more specifically why courts currently scrutinize SIS-
LAPs as intensely as any other laws. Finally, Part III argues that the
courts should scrutinize SISLAPs more leniently under the Dormant
Commerce Clause by adopting a distinct Dormant Commerce Clause
test for SISLAPs. Under this test, courts should presume that the
SISLAP effectuates the purpose of the Lacey Act, while requiring
that the SISLAP be narrowly tailored. This test better balances the
concerns underlying the Dormant Commerce Clause with the unique
purpose of SISLAPs.
8. Id.; 33 CONG. REc. 4871 (1900) ("This bill gives the Secretary
of Agriculture power to aid in the reintroduction, which ...will
prove a useful adjunct to the action of the States which have under-
taken the preservation of the native wild birds.").
9. MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE
LAW 1-2 (3d ed. 1997).
10. See S. REP. No. 97-123, at 2 (1981).
11. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986) (holding Lacey
Act predicate laws may be subjected to strict scrutiny by courts).
2004]
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I. THE LACEY ACT
A. History and Content
In 1900, Iowa Congressman John Lacey proposed legislation to
preserve and restore wildlife resources in the United States.12 By
proposing what later became the Lacey Act, Congressman Lacey
sought to address the rapid population decline of the passenger pi-
geon and other bird species in several states13 and, more importantly
for the purposes of this paper, the dangers that exotic plants and
12. Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America's Premier
Weapon in the Fight Against Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB.
LAND L. REv. 27, 36-37 (1995). Lacey was not the only person con-
cerned with the health of the nation's wildlife. Indeed, Lacey en-
joyed widespread support for his proposed legislation:
"[h]orticulturists, agriculturists, and lovers of birds everywhere, and
also the League of American Sportsmen, and others interested in
game and the protection of game all over the United States have
been strongly enlisted in its support." 33 CONG. REC. 4871 (1900).
13. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Nation Marks Lacey Act Cen-
tennial (May 26, 2000), at
http://news.fws.gov/newsreleases/R9/A 11 C3D49-AC20- 11D4-
A179009027B6B5D3.html [hereinafter Lacey Act Centennial].
Congressman Lacey explained how his proposed act would remedy
the problem of endangered species generally:
The wild pigeon, formerly in this country in flocks of
millions, has entirely disappeared from the face of the
earth. Some hopeful enthusiasts have claimed that the
pigeon would again be heard from in South America, but
there seems to be no well-grounded basis for this hope.
In some localities, certain kinds of grouse have almost
entirely disappeared. This bill gives the Secretary of Ag-
riculture power to aid in the reintroduction, which, I
think, will prove a useful adjunct to the action of the
States which have undertaken the preservation of the na-
tive wild birds.
33 CONG. REC. 4871 (1900).
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animals posed to native fish and wildlife populations.' 4 Congress-
man Lacey explained the damage invasive species posed to beloved
native birds at the turn of the last century and how his proposed act
could have alleviated the demise of these native species:
[i]f [the Lacey Act] had been in force at the time the mis-
take was made in the introduction of the English sparrow
we should have been spared from the pestilential exis-
tence of that 'rat of the air,' that vermin of the atmos-
phere. But some gentlemen who thought they knew bet-
ter than anybody else what the country needed saw fit to
import these little pests, and they have done much toward
driving the native wild bird life out of the States.
15
Thus, Lacey envisioned a law that would protect native wildlife by
curing the problem of the importation of invasive species.
The Lacey Act was not only the "first far-reaching federal wildlife
protection law" 6 but more specifically, marked the first federal at-
tempt to control the introduction of exotic animals. 17 As enacted in
1900, the statute enabled the federal government to help the states
14. John L. Dentler, Noah's Farce: The Regulation and Control of
Exotic Fish and Wildlife, 17 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 191, 210
(1993).
15. 33 CONG. REC. 4871 (1900). Besides the English Sparrow,
Lacey also identified other species, such as the mongoose, that had
proven detrimental to native wildlife populations elsewhere and
whose importation the Secretary of Agriculture could prevent in his
discretion under the Lacey Act:
[t]he mongoose, a miserable, murderous animal that was
introduced for the purpose of killing snakes in Jamaica..
• [it] has proved a nuisance and a pest worse than the ser-
pent that it kills. It drove the rats in Jamaica to the trees
and the rat now there has become an arboreal animal.
The rat still exists and keeps out of the way of the mon-
goose. But the birds of the island have been almost de-
stroyed by this imported pest.
Id.
Today, the federal government prohibits the importation of the mon-
goose along with the flying fox, European rabbit, India dog, raccoon
dog, and brushtail possum. 50 C.F.R. § 16.11 (2003).
16. Lacey Act Centennial, supra note 13.
17. Dentler, supra note 14 at 210.
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control the importation of foreign birds and animals by supplement-
ing state laws to forbid the interstate commerce in such animals and
birds when killed or caught in violation of local laws.' 8 Over one
hundred years after its enactment, the Lacey Act is still the preemi-
nent government weapon against illegal wildlife trafficking. 19 Be-
tween 1993 and 1994 over 700 charges of Lacey Act violations were
filed in federal courts. 20 Moreover, in 1999 alone, the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service investigated more than 1500 possible
Lacey Act violations.21
To increase the Lacey Act's potency, Congress amended it several
times, most recently in 19812 and 1988.23 Today, the Lacey Act
renders it unlawful for anyone to "import, export, transport, sell, re-
ceive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, pos-
sessed, transported or sold in violation of any law ... of the United
,,24States. Additionally, the Act also makes it unlawful to "import,
export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate...
commerce... any fish or wildlife [or plant] taken, possessed, trans-
ported or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State. 25
Consequently, to violate the Lacey Act, "a person must do some-
thing to wildlife that has already been taken or possessed in violation
of [some] law." 26 Specifically, the Lacey Act relies on the violation
of a predicate law, which may be a violation of a federal law, Indian
tribal law, foreign law, or most importantly for the purposes of this
paper, state law.
18. H.R. REP. NO. 56-474, at 2 (1900).
19. Anderson, supra note 12 at 29.
20. Id. at 36.
21. Lacey Act Centennial, supra note 13.
22. See S. REP. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (1981).
23. 16 U.S.C. §3372 (1988). The 1988 amendment to the traffick-
ing provision of the Lacey Act is contained in the current statute.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1) (1988).
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(2)(a) & (b) (1988).
26. See Samuel R. Justice, Fish and Wildlife, 22 ENV. L. 1213,
1217 (1991); United States v. Carpenter, 933 F.2d 748, 750 (9th Cir.
1991) (citing Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-713
(1988)).
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B. The Lacey Act and State Law
Though the Lacey Act is a federal law, its aim is not to increase
"the Federal role in managing wildlife," but rather to create "a Fed-
eral tool to aid the States in enforcing their own laws concerning
wildlife.",27 Thus, the federal government relies on the states to help
effectuate the purpose of the Lacey Act - the preservation of wild-
life.
In 1900, when Congress passed the original act, many states al-
ready had wildlife protection laws. 28 States, however, were unable
to enforce these laws effectively because the rapid transit facilitated
illegal trafficking.2 9 For example, despite the enactment of a Florida
law criminalizing the killing of roseate spoonbills, the mass slaugh-
ter of the birds continued because demand for its beautiful pink
feathers remained high.3 ° Moreover, prior to the enactment of the
Lacey Act "all kinds of game [were] shipped concealed in various
methods to other States where they [were] sold in the open mar-
ket.",3' Congressman Lacey explained the situation before Congress:
27. S. REP. No. 97-123, at 2 (1981).
28. H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900). For instance,
Lacey cites Georgia as having particularly rigid laws regulating the
taking of game birds, and Florida as imposing criminal sanctions on
hunters of birds whose plumes were taken for use in the millinery
industry. 33 CONG. REC. 4871, 4872 (1900).
29. 33 CONG. REC. 4872 (1900).
30. Id. One commentator explained the gravity of the situation:
[a]s early as 1885 and 1886 entire colonies [of inedible
water birds] were wiped out along Florida's Gulf Coast
where rewards to the hunters ran from forty cents for a
graceful mating plume ... of the Great White Heron up
to two dollars for the pink-hued body and breast of the
Roseate Spoonbill. In some instances, when only a por-
tion of the bird was of value, . . . the hunters removed
those parts and left the offal in the field. The record kill
for one man in one season was 141 thousand birds.
THEODORE WHALEY CART, THE STRUGGLE FOR WILDLIFE
PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870-1900: ATTITUDES AND
EVENTS LEADING TO THE LACEY ACT, 30-31 (1971); Auk, XVII
(January, 1900), 94, 95.
31. H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900).
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[t]rappers go Georgia and catch the quail, net or trap
them in violation of local law, pack them in barrels or
boxes and ship them to other markets in the United
States. It is done secretly. The result is that the market
houses in other States have been utilized as places in
which to dispose of these birds and animals killed in vio-
lation of the laws of the State.32
It was difficult enough for states to enforce their own wildlife pro-
tection laws within their borders, but once the wildlife was within
the stream of interstate commerce, the states were completely power-
less.33 The Lacey Act presented a solution to this problem.
Congress passed the Lacey Act to extend state wildlife protection
laws into the realm of interstate commerce. 34 At the time of its en-
actment, states could not directly regulate interstate commerce 35 and
the federal government could not regulate conduct occurring solely
within a state. 36 Congress, in enacting the Lacey act explained it this
way:
32. 33 CONG. REc. 4871 (1900).
33. See H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900) (noting "State
laws can have no extraterritorial force... and the national laws cannot
operate in a single State").
34. See id.
35. See H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900) (noting "State
laws can have no extraterritorial force."); see also, Cooley v. Bd. of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 299 (1851). In Cooley, the Court drew dis-
tinctions between legislative subject matter that was truly national
versus subject matter that was exclusively entrusted to the states.
Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318. According to the Cooley doctrine, the
Commerce Clause precluded a state from regulating a truly national
subject, such as goods in interstate commerce like wildlife. See Wel-
ton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (holding that Congress has the
exclusive power to regulate "transportation and exchange of com-
modities").
36. See H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900) (noting
"[N]ational laws can not operate in a single State."), see also Cooley,
53 U.S. at 319. Cooley also dictated that the Commerce Clause pre-
cluded Congress from regulating truly local matters. Id. Moreover,
at the time of the Lacey Act's passage, it was widely thought that
wildlife belonged collectively to the residents of a state and thus the
regulation of wildlife preservation was believed to be a purely local
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[t]his bill is intended to begin where the State laws leave
off. The State laws can have no extraterritorial force and
the national laws can not operate in a single State. But
interstate commerce is wholly in the control of the Fed-
eral Government. Where the States are powerless to pro-
tect themselves the National Government has ample
power. This bill goes to the very root of this matter by
forbidding interstate commerce in such animals and birds
when killed or caught in violation of local laws.
37
Thus, simply enacting federal legislation would not solve the prob-
lem of wildlife taking and trafficking. Instead, Congress created a
two-tiered system for holding illegal wildlife traffickers account-
able. 38 The first tier consists of an underlying or predicate law or
regulation that regulates the taking, possession, transportation, or
sale of wildlife. 39 This predicate law or regulation may be a federal
law, Indian tribal law, foreign law or state law.4 0 SISLAPs generally
regulate the transportation of wildlife by banning the importation of
invasive species. Examples of other state laws that could serve as
Lacey Act predicate laws include: laws that completely ban the tak-
ing of certain wildlife;42 laws that ban hunting certain species outside• 43
of a designated season for huntinE and laws that prohibit the pos-
session of illegally taken wildlife.
issue and out-of-reach of Congress. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U.S. 519, 529 (1896).
37. H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900).
38. Justice, supra note 26 at 1216-1217.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1988).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 84D.02 (2002) (establishing "a state-
wide program to prevent and curb the spread of harmful exotic spe-
cies"); TEX PARK & WILD. CODE § 66.015 (2003) (regulates the in-
troduction of nonnative game fish into the public water of Texas).
42. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 183D-62 (2003) (pertaining to
wild birds in Hawaii).
43. See, e.g., 10 VT. STAT. ANN. § 4741 (2001) (establishing a
sixteen day deer hunting season in Vermont).
44. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 41-14-1 (2003) (making it a
criminal offense to possess or control any unlawfully taken bird,
animal, or fish in South Dakota).
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The second tier of the Lacey Act makes it a crime to "import, ex-
port, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase" wildlife that was
taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of a predicate
law.45 Thus, the Lacey Act does nothing in and of itself. Except for
federal predicate laws, the federal government is reliant on Indian
tribes, foreign countries, and states to determine what species of
wildlife need protecting and what species those jurisdictions need
protection from. The federal government is often reliant on the
states to regulate wildlife because Lacey Act prosecutions often in-
volve predicate state laws. In addition, originally, the only predicate
laws were state laws.46 Congressman Lacey was mostly concerned
with empowering state laws to be more effective at protecting wild-
life.47 For these reasons, Congress has enlisted the states as partners
in effectuating the purpose of the Lacey Act.
C. A Federal Tool to Enforce State Invasive Species Laws
The federal government may use the Lacey Act to combat the in-
troduction of invasive species in two ways. First, the regulations
implementing the Lacey Act generally prohibit the importation of
live wildlife that is injurious to the United States.48 However, these
federal regulations are notoriously weak. 49 These regulations adopt
a "dirty list" approach - that is, the regulations only prohibit those
species that are designated by the Department of the Interior from
entry into the United States. This centralized dirty list approach
has proven to be ineffective. The Department of the Interior only
45. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1988).
46. See CART, supra note 30 at 190 (reprinting the original Lacey
Act).
47. See 33 CONG. REc. 4871 (1900).
48. 50 C.F.R. § 16.3 (1992); see also 18 U.S.C. § 42 (1994).
49. See David M. Whalin, The Control of Aquatic Nuisance Non-
indigenous Species, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 65, 104 (1998) (recognizing the
federal regulations of invasive species of the Lacey Act to be a "fail-
ure" in combating the problem of invasive species); Dentler, supra
note 14 at 212-13 (noting that the shortcomings of these regulations
have been recognized for at least thirty years).
50. Eric Biber, Exploring Regulatory Options for Controlling the
Introduction of Non-Indigenous Species to the United States, 18 VA.
ENV'L L. J. 375, 391 (1999).
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lists species that have proven elsewhere to be harmful to native wild-
life.51 Moreover, the federal government must overcome a high bur-
den of proof to justify the designation of a species as sufficiently
* . 52injurious. Thus, the regulations prohibit only the absolute worst
offending nonnative species from entering the United States.
53
The second way in which the Lacey Act combats the problem of
invasive species is by elevating violations of state laws that regulate
the importation of invasive species to federal offenses. 54 States
regulate invasive species by either allowing the importation of spe-
cies designated on a "clean list '55 or by banning the importation of
species designated on a "dirty list." 56 Whatever the form, the federal
government may use state laws that regulate the importation of wild-
life into the state as Lacey Act predicate laws.
57
Using the Lacey Act to elevate an offense of state invasive species
laws to a federal offense is a more effective way to combat invasive
species than relying merely on the federal regulations under the
Lacey Act. First, the use of the Lacey Act in this way increases the
potency of state laws. This is particularly important because not
only have the federal regulations under the Lacey Act been ineffec-
tive in combating invasive species, but other attempts at federal in-
vasive species regulations have also been generally unsuccessful.58
51. Dentler, supra note 14 at 211.
52. Whalin, supra note 49 at 105.
53. See generally id.
54. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1988); see also Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a Lacey Act violation where an individ-
ual imported bait fish in violation of Maine law).
55. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2271 (1998) (restricting
the importation of live aquatic plants or animals into the state of
California without a permit).
56. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 150A-6.1 - 150A-6.3 (2003)
(restricting importation of listed plants, animals, or microorganisms
into the state of Hawaii).
57. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1988).
58. See e.g., The Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention
and Control Act of 1990 (NANCPA), 16 U.S.C. § 4711(a) (1997),
and the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 16 U.S.C. §
4711(b)(2)(B)(i) (1997) (regulating the inadvertent importation of
invasive species, mainly the notorious zebra mussel, from the ballast
water of ships traveling on the Great Lakes).
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Such laws, like the Lacey Act federal regulations, are extremely lim-
ited in scope and thus extremely limited in their effectiveness.Y
9
Fixing these federal laws would likely not be enough. Because of
the geographic nature of the problem, states are simply in the best
position to effectively regulate invasive species.60 One commentator
concisely enumerated the reasons why the states are more capable of
effectively regulating invasive species:
a state has firsthand knowledge of what kinds of [inva-
sive species] may be entering its jurisdiction and through
which vectors. [Also], a state can better monitor the myr-
iad of [invasive species] that are in its jurisdiction. Next,
as a general rule, state response is more immediate than
federal response in acute situations. Finally, a state proc-
ess is often less cumbersome than a federal process, al-
lowing more flexibility and efficiency in approaching
[invasive species] management.6 1
Despite the need for state invasive species law to recognize the
variation in degree and kind of the invasive species problem from
region to region, state regulation of invasive species without the co-
operation of the federal government is not without its critics. 62 The
59. See Viki Nadol, Aquatic Invasive Species in the Coastal West:
An Analysis of State Regulation Within a Federal Framework, 29
ENVTL. LAW. 339, 358-59 (1999) (noting that the scope of the man-
datory regulations of the Acts are limited to the Great Lakes region
and that the only aquatic invasive species subject to regulation under
the Acts is ballast water).
60. See Biber, supra note 50 at 463-64 (recognizing that local
variations in wildlife populations and ecosystems necessitate differ-
ent treatment of the problem of invasive species based on geogra-
phy). See also National Invasive Species Council, National Man-
agement Plan: Meeting the Invasive Species Challenge, at
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/council/actionplan.shtml (Jan. 18,
2001) (outlining the National Invasive Species Council's 2001 ac-
tion plan drafted in accordance with Exec. Order No. 13,112, 3
C.F.R. Exec. Order 13,112 (2000)).
61. Nadol, supra note 59 at 372.
62. See, e.g., Dentler, supra note 14 at 229-30 (1993) (arguing
that a state-only approach is bound to fail because wildlife cannot be
contained in one state and that state-by-state regulation is economi-
cally inefficient).
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typical criticism of a state-only approach to combating invasive spe-
cies is that:
[b]y their very nature, [invasive species] are interjurisdic-
tional and, therefore, pose threats that are national in
scope. In addition, state-by-state regulation can produce
inconsistent results and conflicts and states lack the
power to control the importation and release of [invasive
species] in neighboring states. Further, although federal
regulation may be difficult to initiate, once it is enacted it
can be broad in scope and application.
63
However, these "problems" with a state-law-only approach are
also its assets. It is true that some invasive species are harmful in
every part of the U.S. 64 It is also true that a native species in one
part of the U.S. may be a danger to the wildlife in another region.
65
Moreover, a species not native to the U.S. may pose a particular risk
to one region of the country while posing virtually no threat to an-
other.
66
63. Nadol, supra note 59 at 372.
64. Some species nonnative to the U.S. are so resistant to climate
and geographical variations that they threaten the entire United
States. The snakehead is one such species. See supra note 1 and ac-
companying text. Also, new potential threats to the wildlife of the
United States are genetically engineered animals and plants. For
example, a Texas company recently stated its intention to sell
"GloFish" which are zebra fish with an added red coral gene that
makes them glow in the dark. Andrew Pollack, Gene-Altering Revo-
lution Is About to Reach the Local Pet Store: Glow-in-the-Dark
Fish, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 2003, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/22/science/22FISH.html?8hpib.
Some environmental groups fear that if these and other genetically
altered pets are released into the wild they could wreak havoc on
native wildlife. Id.
65. Walleye, for example, is a fish that threatens the wildlife in
the Columbia River system in Washington, but are native to the
Great Lakes region of the U.S. Nadol, supra note 59 at 340, n.5.
66. Saltcedar is a nonnative plant particularly fond of the climate
in the southwest United States, where it oozes salt from its leaves
that accumulates in the soil and prevents other plants from growing
near it. The Nature Conservancy, The Invasive Species Initiative
Tamarix species: Saltcedar (Tamarisk) at
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Nevertheless, the state-only approach is imperfect and the Lacey
Act is at least a partial solution to its problems. When violations of
state invasive species laws are elevated to federal offenses, the state
policy behind the law is elevated to national policy. Elevating viola-
tions of state invasive species laws to federal offenses would make it
more likely that someone who is considering importing an animal or
plant is on notice that such importation may be illegal. This is espe-
cially true for an out-of-state importer. Moreover, the federal gov-
ernment may pick and choose which state violations it wishes to ele-
vate to federal offenses which would effectively reward states that
pass laws that effectuate federal objectives and thus lead to more
uniform state laws. Although some of the problems associated with
a state-law-only regime for combating invasive species remain, the
best method for combating the importation of invasive species is to
increase Lacey Act prosecutions for the violation of state invasive
species laws.
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The main barrier to protecting native wildlife from invasive spe-
cies via Lacey Act prosecutions is the Dormant Commerce Clause.
67
The Dormant Commerce Clause applies to any state law that poten-
tially overly burdens interstate commerce. 68 In other words, courts
will scrutinize any state law that directly or indirectly affects inter-
state commerce. Because SISLAPs regulate goods-in this case,
wildlife-transported in interstate commerce, SISLAPs potentially
overly burden interstate commerce and are thus subject to Dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny.69
http://tncweeds.ucdavis.edu/worst/tamarix.html#map (updated
March, 2002). Saltcedar is not a serious threat in any other region of
the United States. Id.
67. Nadol, supra note 59 at 360-61; Whalin, supra note 49 at 106-
07.
68. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 401 (2d ed.
2002).
69. See generally Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). For a
discussion of this case see infra Parts II.A-B.
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A. History
The Dormant Commerce Clause does not appear in the Constitu-
tion.70 Rather, it is a judicially created doctrine that serves to protect
what the Supreme Court deemed to be the purpose of the Commerce
Clause--competition among the states rather than protectionism and
isolationism.
7
The Constitution granted Congress the power to "regulate Com-
merce ...among the several states. 72 The Framers included the
"Commerce Clause" because under the Articles of Confederation the
states had unlimited power to regulate commerce and enacted pro-
tectionist legislation that isolated internal markets from external
competition. The Supreme Court articulated it this way:
The design and object of [the power to regulate interstate
commerce], as evinced in the history of the Constitution,
was to establish a perfect equality amongst the several
States as to commercial rights, and to prevent unjust and
invidious distinctions, which local jealousies or local and
70. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 11.1 (3d ed.
1999).
71. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)
("[T]he Commerce Clause .. .reflected a central concern of the
Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional
Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union
would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization
that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the
States under the Articles of Confederation."). Note, however, that
the Framers did not necessarily express a desire for a free market
economy. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429 (1982).
72. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
73. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond Comm'r of Agric. and
Mkts. of N.Y., 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) ("'[E]ach state would legis-
late according to its estimate of its own interests, the importance of
its own products, and the local advantages or disadvantages of its
position in a political or commercial view.' This came 'to threaten at
once the peace and safety of the Union."').
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partial interests might be disposed to introduce and main-
tain.74
Thus, the Framers saw state balkanization as a fundamental flaw in
the Articles of Confederation and sought to remedy the situation by
granting Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the
states.
The Constitution, however, does not state whether this grant of
power to Congress precludes states from regulating interstate com-
merce or regulating some other subject within their general police
powers that incidentally affects interstate commerce. 76 Conceivably
the set of subjects that Congress may regulate under its Commerce
Clause powers overlaps with the set of subjects that states may regu-
late under their police powers. 77 When Congress has not regulated a
subject within this overlap, states may regulate in this area as long as
such regulation is consistent with the purpose of the Commerce
Clause 78-that is, insulating internal markets from out-of-state com-
petition.79 Additionally, as long as Congress has the power under
the Commerce Clause, it may expand the power of states to regulate
interstate commerce where the Dormant Commerce Clause would
80
otherwise preclude the state from legislating.
74. Veazie & Young v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852).
75. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 535.
76. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 70 § 11.1.
77. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 204 ("[I]f a State in pass-
ing laws on subjects acknowledged to be within its control, and with
a view to those subjects, shall adopt a measure of the same character
with one which Congress may adopt, it does not derive its authority
from the particular power which has been granted, but from some
other, which remains with the State, and may be executed by the
same means.").
78. See Hill v. State of Fla. ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 547
(1945) ("The States ... may speak on matters even in the general
domain of commerce so long as Congress is silent.").
79. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 532 ("[A] State may
not promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or burden-
ing of interstate commerce.").
80. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,
87-88 (1984).
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The Supreme Court has developed the structure and form of Dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence over almost two centuries. 81
Today, modem Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence consists of
two tests to determine whether a law unconstitutionally burdens in-
terstate commerce. 82 State laws that are not even-handed, that is
laws that facially discriminate against out-of-state interests, are pre-
sumed invalid unless the state can show that there is a non-
protectionist reason for treating in-state residents more favorably
than out-of-state residents and that there are no other less discrimina-
tory means to effectuate this legitimate purpose. 83 In other words,
courts will apply strict scrutiny to state laws that a court determines
facially discriminate against interstate commerce and thus such laws
will likely be invalidated.84
On the other hand, facially neutral laws that regulate "evenhand-
edly with only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce:
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on inter-
state activities.
85
The Pike test, as this balancing test is called, upholds a state statute
unless the burdens created by the statute on interstate commerce
clearly outweigh the benefits to the state. 86 Thus, if a court deter-
mines that the law does not facially discriminate against interstate
commerce that law will likely withstand that court's scrutiny. For
these reasons, the threshold question of whether the state law at issue
is facially discriminatory likely makes the difference whether that
law will be upheld.
81. Gibbons was the first "Dormant Commerce Clause case." 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1.
82. Chambers Med. Technologies of S.C., Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d
1252, 1256 (1995).
83. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 336; Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
84. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337.
85. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
86. Id.
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B. Maine v. Taylor-The Dormant Commerce Clause Applied to
SISLAPs
The Supreme Court set the precedent for scrutinizing SISLAPs
under the Dormant Commerce Clause in Maine v. Taylor." This
case established the precedent that SISLAPs should be treated the
same as any other state law for purposes of Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 88 Taylor, a citizen of Maine, was charged with vio-
lating the Lacey Act by importing baitfish in violation of a Maine
statute. 89 This statute made it unlawful for any person to import live
baitfish into Maine.90 Taylor's sole defense was that the Maine stat-
ute violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because it unconstitu-
tionally burdened interstate commerce.
91
The district court convicted Taylor, finding that the Maine law did
not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause despite concluding that
the law facially discriminated against interstate commerce. 92 With-
out providing a basis for its reasoning, the district court concluded
that the Maine law facially discriminated against interstate com-
merce. 93 Even though the case involved section 3372(a)(2) of the
Lacey Act, which is enforced by cooperating state and federal gov-
ernments, the district court declined to lower the level of scrutiny,
reasoning that Congress, by enacting the Lacey Act, did not ex-
pressly intend for predicate laws under it to be insulated from Com-
merce Clause analysis.
94
The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court that the
Maine statute could withstand dormant Commerce Clause strict scru-
tiny.95 The court concluded that, absent Congress's express consent,
87. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
88. See id. at 139.
89. Id. at 132.
90. Id. at 133; See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 12 § 7613
(1981).
91. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 133.
92. United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 394-398 (D. Me.
1984). (concluding that, while the statute discriminated facially dis-
criminated against interstate commerce, it served a legitimate local
interest and that less discriminatory alternatives were not available).
93. Id. at 395.
94. Id. at 394 & n.3, 395.
95. United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757, 761 (1st Cir. 1985).
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it would analyze the law under the Dormant Commerce Clause as if
Congress was never involved.96 The appellate court found that the
statute should be given strict scrutiny because it intentionally bur-
dened interstate commerce. 97 The appellate court reversed the dis-
trict court's decision because it found that Maine could not over-
come strict scrutiny analysis; the state neither proved that the statute
effectuated a legitimate non-protectionist purpose nor that the statute
was narrowly tailored to effectuate its proffered purpose.
98
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court which, relying on
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v Wunnicke,99 also held
that Lacey Act predicate laws should be treated like any other laws
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 100 In South-Central Timber,
the state of Alaska argued that Congress impliedly approved of its
law requiring timber harvesters to process logs harvested in the state.
101 The justification for Alaska's claim was that a federal law re-
quired the same for timber harvested from federal land. °2 However,
the Court in South Central Timber rejected this argument, holding
that a parallel federal law does not shield a state law from Dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny. 10 3 Moreover, the Court concluded that
Congress must be "unmistakably clear" of its intent to insulate par-
96. Id. at 764 (noting that the Supreme Court has stated "that for a
state regulation to be removed from the reach of the dormant Com-
merce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear" and
concluding that, here, an unmistakably clear design to validate state
laws cannot be found where the overarching principle embodied in
the legislative history is the intent to back up valid state enactments
with federal enforcement power). Id.
97. Id. at 760.
98. Id. at 763.
99. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
100. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986).
101. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 89.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 92 ("The fact that the state policy appears to be consis-
tent with federal policy is an insufficient indicium of congressional
intent. Congress acted only with respect to federal lands; we cannot
infer from that fact that it intended to authorize a similar policy with
respect to state lands.") Id.
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ticular state laws from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny; other-
wise, the risk of state protectionism is too high.'0
4
In Taylor; the Court similarly held that in order for Congress to in-
sulate a state law from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, Con-
gress must clearly express its intent to do so. °5 Maine's example of
language evincing Congressional intent to insulate Lacey predicate
laws was this excerpt from the Senate Report on the 1981 Lacey Act
Amendments:
It is desirable to extend protection to species of wildlife
not now covered by the Lacey Act, and to plants which
are presently not covered at all. States and foreign gov-
ernments are encouraged to protect a broad variety of
species. Legal mechanisms should be supportive of those
governments.
1 06
The Court found that this section of legislative history was not
enough to demonstrate an unmistakably clear Congressional inten-
tion to override the Dormant Commerce Clause.
10 7
Moreover, the Taylor Court went one step further. Maine argued
that even if the Court found that Congress did not intend to insulate
Lacey Act predicate laws from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny,
Congress stressed the importance of Lacey Act predicate law in its
legislative history for the 1981 Lacey Act Amendments; therefore,
the Court should lower the intensity of its scrutiny of SISLAPs. 10
8
The Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that either Con-
gress insulates state laws from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny
or the laws will be scrutinized like any other state law. 1°9 Thus, the
Taylor Court concluded that Lacey Act predicate laws will not be
104. Id. at 91 ("A rule requiring a clear expression of approval by
Congress ensures that there is, in fact, such a collective decision and
reduces significantly the risk that underrepresented interests will be
adversely affected by restraints on commerce.") Id. at 92.
105. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139.
106. Id. at 140 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-123, at 3-4 (1981)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 139. Although Maine conceded before the Court that the
Lacey Act Amendments do not exempt state wildlife legislation
from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, the State insisted, how-
ever, that the Amendments should lower the intensity of the scrutiny
that would otherwise be applied. Id
109. Id.
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treated differently than any other state laws for Dormant Commerce
Clause purposes.
With this issue settled, the Taylor Court next determined that the
Maine law facially discriminated against interstate commerce and
should therefore be subjected to strict review." The Court relied on
Hughes v. Oklahoma"' in coming to this conclusion." 2 Hughes was
an appeal of a conviction of a violation of a state wildlife law that
did not involve a Lacey Act prosecution. 13 The Hughes Court con-
cluded that when scrutinizing state wildlife statutes under the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause a court:
[M]ust inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regu-
lates evenhandedly with only 'incidental' effects on inter-
state commerce, or discriminates against interstate com-
merce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether
the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so,
(3) whether alternative means could promote this local
purpose as well without discriminating against interstate
commerce. 114
The first question was the threshold question. If a court concludes
that the statute does not regulate evenhandedly or that it facially or
effectively discriminates between in-state and out-of-state interests,
110. Id. at 144. But like the district court opinion, the Supreme
Court did not give its reasoning for this conclusion.
111. 441 U.S. 332, 328 (1979).
112. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 144.
113. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 328. It is interesting, however, to note
that an article often cited as an authority on the Lacey Act states that
Hughes did involve a Lacey Act violation. See Anderson, supra
note 12 at 76 ("[I]n Hughes v. Oklahoma, a defendant was convicted
of Lacey Act charges after exporting minnows...."). In fact, the Su-
preme Court case was an appeal of a state court opinion, Hughes v.
State, 572 P.2d 573 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977), affirming the appel-
lant's conviction for violating an Oklahoma law. See Anderson, su-
pra note 12 at 76 ("[I]n Hughes v. Oklahoma, a defendant was con-
victed of Lacey Act charges after exporting minnows....").
114. 441 U.S. at 336.
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then the court will apply strict scrutiny represented by the second
and third steps of the quoted 
analysis." 
The law at issue in Hughes unlike the law at issue in Taylor did not
regulate the importation of an invasive species. Instead, it prohibited
the transportation or shipment of minnows fished out of Oklahoma
waters for sale outside of the state. 1 6 The Court determined that
because the law prohibited the exportation of minnows from the state
it "overtly block[ed] the flow of interstate commerce at [the] State's
borders." 7 From this, the Court concluded that the statute facially
discriminated against interstate commerce.1" 8 Presumably, this rea-
soning was adopted by the Court in Taylor. 19
Despite applying the "strictest scrutiny" to the Maine law at issue
in Taylor, the Court found that the law did not violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 20 The Court deferred to the fact-finding of the
district court and concluded that the bait fish law effectuated a le-
gitimate, non-protectionist purpose. 121 The Court also deferred to
115. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511
U.S. 93, 99 (1994) ("If a restriction on commerce [imposed by a
state law] is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid.").
116. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 323.
117. Id. at 336-37 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1978)) (alterations in original).
118. Id.
119. The Supreme Court simply says that both lower courts cor-
rectly applied Hughes and determined that the Maine law facially
discriminated against interstate commerce. Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131,139 (1986). The Supreme Court is just about as mysterious
as the district court, simply concluding that the Maine statute facially
discriminates against interstate commerce. See Taylor, 477 U.S. at
138 ("The District Court and the Court of Appeals both reasoned
correctly that, since Maine's import ban discriminates on its face
against interstate trade, it should be subject to the strict requirements
of Hughes v. Oklahoma...."). Nevertheless, both courts cite Hughes
for this conclusion. Because the law at issue in Hughes is so similar
to the law at issue in Taylor, it follows that the district court and the
Supreme Court relied on more than the rule in that case by also rely-
ing on the Hughes Court's characterization of the Oklahoma statute.
120. Id. at 151-52.
121. Id. at 148. The Court discounted evidence in the form of a
statement submitted by the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries in
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the district court's conclusion that the law interfered with interstate
commerce no more than necessary to carry out that purpose.122 For
these reasons, the Court upheld the SISLAP in Taylor.12-
C. Taylor's Effect on SISLAPs
The Court held that all Lacey Act predicate laws will be scruti-
nized as intensely as any other state laws under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause. In terms of SISLAPs, such as the law at issue in Tay-
lor, the Taylor holding undoubtedly means that almost all state inva-
sive species laws will be subject to the "strictest scrutiny." State
invasive species laws almost invariably impose bans on the importa-
tion of listed or unlisted species that the state has determined
threaten native species.124 Absolute bans on the importation of out-
of-state goods facially discriminate against interstate commerce. 125
opposition to a proposed repeal of the law, that the Court of Appeals
found indicated that the Maine law had a protectionist purpose:
We can't help asking why we should spend our money in
Arkansas when it is far better spent at home? It is very
clear that much more can be done here in Maine to pro-
vide our sportsmen with safe, home-grown bait. There is
also the possibility that such an industry could develop a
lucrative export market in neighboring states.
Id. at 149.
122. Id. at 146. The Court cited evidence that sufficient testing of
bait fish for parasites had not been developed. On the other hand,
evidence that such tests were feasible and that Maine allowed the
importation of other fish without inspections was weighed by the
district court but ultimately disregarded. Id.
123. Id. at 152.
124. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)
(holding that a New Jersey law banning the importation of waste into
the state facially discriminated against interstate commerce);
Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that
a Texas law banning the importation of out-of-state wine facially
discriminated against interstate commerce); Used Tire Intern. Inc., v.
Diaz-Saldana, 155 F.3d 1, 3 (1998) (holding that a Puerto Rico law
banning the importation of used tires below a certain tread facially
discriminated against interstate commerce).
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However, despite holding that laws prohibiting the importation of
a species are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny, the Court in
Taylor also held that it will uphold a state law that is necessary to
further a "legitimate local purpose.' ' 26 This indicates that the Court
requires two things to uphold a law under the strict Hughes test: (1)
that the law furthers a "legitimate local purpose;" and (2) that the
law restricts interstate commerce only to the degree necessary to
effectuate that purpose. 127 For this first question, it seems the Court
will apply a rational basis test-that is determine whether the state
law is rationally related to a non-protectionist purpose.128 The only
difference between this formulation and the Pike test is that under
the Pike test the amount of permitted interference of interstate com-
merce depends on the importance of the purpose of the law. 129
This characterization of the Taylor holding is further evidenced by
the Court's treatment of the SISLAP at issue in that case. The Tay-
lor Court recognized the importance of protecting a state's native
wildlife from the effects of invasive species. The Court found the
Maine bait fish law furthered a legitimate local purpose even without
definitive scientific proof that allowing out-of-state bait fish into the
state would cause serious harm 13° and with evidence that the law
might indeed be protectionist. 131 Indeed, one commentary describes
the possibility that the Court in Taylor did not rely on the highest
level of scrutiny of the Maine SISLAP:
[u]nder the Court's current formulation, the state must
overcome a formidable burden of proof, given the strong
presumption against facially discriminatory statutes. We
are not sure the Taylor Court's scrutiny was quite this
rigorous in reality. The evidence on behalf of the state
126. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
127. Id.
128. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.3.6 (2d
ed. 2002).
129. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on inter-
state activities.").
130. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148.
131. Id. at 150.
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shows the statute had a possible justification, but not that
it, in fact, was necessary.
1 32
Thus, despite claiming to apply the strictest scrutiny to the
SISLAP in Taylor, the Court questioned whether the law was ration-
ally related to combating invasive species and whether the law was
narrowly tailored to carry out that purpose.
III. A REEXAMINATION
A. SISLAPs Require A Different Level of Dormant Commerce
Clause Scrutiny
Under either the Hughes test or the Pike test, courts typically in-
validate two classes of state laws under the Dormant Commerce
Clause: (1) laws that states legislatures intended to insulate in-state
markets from out-of-state competition; and (2) laws that state legis-
latures intended to insulate state residents from the burdens of a
commercial activity to the detriment of residents of other states.
1 33
Almost invariably, when courts strike down a state law on Dormant
Commerce Clause grounds, the Court has determined that the state's
132. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the
Regulatory State: A Gatt's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1434 (1994).
133. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194
(1994) (invalidating a state milk pricing order because "[i]ts avowed
purpose and its undisputed effect are to enable higher cost Massa-
chusetts dairy farmers to compete with lower cost dairy farmers in
other States"); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware,
450 U.S. 662 (1981) (invalidating an Iowa law barring use of trucks
longer than sixty feet on Iowa's interstate highways because the law
protected in-state drivers from the hazards of heavy truck traffic at
the expense of the safety of drivers in neighboring states); Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating a New Jersey
law that banned the importation of out-of-state waste at least par-
tially for the purpose of preserving landfill space within the state to
the detriment of neighboring states); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Ad-
ver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidating a law requiring a
specific inspection of apples sold within the state because it pro-
tected in-state apple growers from out of state competition).
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proffered purpose for the enacting the law was a pretext and that the
real purpose of the law was to further one of these two illicit protec-
tionist motives.' 
34
However, SISLAPs are rarely protectionist. The SISLAP in Tay-
lor represents the most likely case for such a law to be protectionist.
Indeed, the facts surrounding the Taylor bait fish law were more
conducive to a finding that the law was protectionist than the facts
surrounding other SISLAPs. Taylor produced some evidence
against Maine that demonstrated that perhaps Maine was protecting
its bait fish market from out-of-state competition. 35 Unlike most of
the species regulated under SISLAPs, many states have substantial
bait fish industries.' 36 For example, many state laws ban the impor-
tation of species not native to the United States, such as the Asian
swamp eel 137 or the European green crab. 38 State legislatures, in
134. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 196 (holding that
the real purpose of a pricing order was to insulate in-state milk pro-
ducers from out-of-state competition); Kassel, 450 U.S. at 677
(holding that the real purpose of an Iowa truck length restriction was
to insulate in-state residents from the hazards of interstate truck traf-
fic to the detriment of the residents of the surrounding states );
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629 (holding that at least to some extent, a
purpose behind a New Jersey law that banned the importation of
out-of-state waste was to preserve landfill space within the state to
the detriment of neighboring states); Hunt, 432 U.S. 353-54 (holding
that the real purpose for a North Carolina apple inspection law was
to insulate in-state apple growers from out-of-state competition).
135. See supra note 121.
136. See Thomas G. Meronek et al., The Bait Industry in Illinois,
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin 5 (1997),
at http://aquanic.org/publicat/usdarac/trlncracltb O5.pdf (discuss-
ing the state of the golden shiner industry).
137. See, e.g., TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE § 66.007 (2003). The
Asian swamp eel is a species not native to the U.S. that biologists
have found in Georgia's Chattahoochee River and the Florida Ever-
glades. The Water Resources Research Institute, Another Invasive
Exotic, at
http://www2.ncsu.edu/ncsu/CILIWRRI/news/ja98digest.html#Anothe
r%20invasive. The Asian swamp eel is particularly noxious be-
cause:
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enacting such laws, cannot insulate an in-state market from out-of-
state competition where no such market exists.1 39 Moreover, when a
SISLAP is before a court it is because the federal government prose-
cuted the violation of state law under the Lacey Act. The federal
government will likely have no interest in prosecuting a violation of
a protectionist state law because such a law would likely not further
the purpose of the Lacey Act.14
0
[t]he eels are highly secretive, with most of their activi-
ties occurring at night. In the day, the fish hide in thick
aquatic vegetation or in small burrows and crevices along
the water's edge. In many populations, all young are
hatched as females. Then, after spending part of their life
as females, the eels transform into large males. The ex-
otic creature is a highly adaptable predator, able to
breathe air and to live easily in even a few inches of wa-
ter, especially in warm climates. Although few non-
native fishes invade natural wetlands-instead being pri-
marily found in disturbed habitats such as canals and
drainage ditches-the swamp eel's biology makes it well
suited for all kinds of habitats.
Id.
138. See, e.g. WAC 220-72-076 (2003). The European green crab
has been found along the western coast of the U.S. Aquatic Nui-
sance Species, at http://www.alaska.net/-aknafws/aquatic.html. The
European green crab is particularly noxious because it "is voracious,
and has been described as an eating machine." Id. Moreover,
"[t]hey have stronger and more maneuverable claws than other
crabs." Id.
139. The European brown crab in particular has virtually no value
as it is not suitable to eat. Id.
140. This is not to say that all prosecutions are pursued with the
purpose of the law in mind. It is certainly conceivable that the fed-
eral government might prosecute any violation of state law that in-
volves the taking, possession, transportation, or sale of wildlife in
violation of state law that does not further either the prevention of
over-harvesting or the prevention of introducing an invasive species.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. Such a prosecution,
however, is unlikely, not only because most state invasive species
laws are not protectionist, but also because the federal government
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In addition, SISLAPs are more akin to quarantine laws which have
historically been treated more favorably under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause than other state laws since such laws are generally
non-protectionist. Under the quarantine exception, a state quaran-
tine law is upheld as long as it is rationally related to the purpose of
a quarantining and narrowly tailored to effectuate that purpose.
142
This is almost precisely the test used in Taylor.143 The Supreme
Court has held that quarantine laws effectuate an important local
purpose because they serve to prevent exposure to disease, injury, or
destruction to a state's people and wildlife. 144 Certainly, state inva-
has limited resources and if has to choose between two cases will
likely take the case more in-line with the purpose of the Act.
141. In fact, several other commentators have characterized Taylor
as an example of the Court recognizing bans on the importation of
invasive species as falling under the "quarantine exception" to the
Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g. Blair P. Bremberg & David
C. Short, The Quarantine Exception to the Dormant Commerce
Power Doctrine Revisited: The Importance of Proofs in Solid Waste
Management Cases, 21 N.M.L. REV. 63, 78 (1990); Donald H.
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1270
(1986).
142. Bowman v. Chi. & N. Ry., 125 U.S. 465,491 (1888). ("While
... a State may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of life,
liberty, health, or property within its borders; while it may prevent
persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious dis-
eases, or convicts, etc., from entering the State; while for the purpose
of self-protection it may establish quarantine and reasonable inspec-
tion laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the
State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. It
may not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially
prohibit or burden either foreign or state commerce ...." (quoting
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465) in which the court invalidated a
Missouri law prohibiting driving cattle into that state between March
1 and Nov 1 of each year. The court said the law was more than a
quarantine regulation and not a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the state).
143. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
144. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. Wash., 270 U.S. 87, 93
(1926). This case held that:
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sive species laws protect a state's wildlife from disease, injury, or
destruction.
In spite of the similarities, the quarantine exception does not go far
enough to protect SISLAPs. Unlike quarantine laws, SISLAPs ef-
fectuate not only an important state purpose, but also an important
national purpose. One of the founding purposes of the Lacey Act
was to protect domestic wildlife from the threat of invasive spe-
cies. 145 When the federal government uses the Lacey Act to enforce
a state invasive species law, that prosecution is not just for the bene-
fit of the state, but also for the benefit of the nation.' 46 Moreover, to
further this important national purpose, the federal government
needs the states to legislate because national attempts at combating
invasive species have generally failed. 14 7 Thus, without state inva-
sive species laws, there would be no useful predicate laws on which
to combat invasive species with the Lacey Act. Instead of threaten-
ing state invasive species laws with Dormant Commerce Clause
challenges, states should be encouraged to enact invasive species
laws to effectuate the purpose of the Lacey Act.
B. A Presumption of Validity
Courts should presume that SISLAPs further a legitimate purpose
unless the party challenging the law produces evidence that the law
is protectionist. For example, the challenging party might present
evidence of a significant in-state production of the banned species,
legislative history expressing some protectionist motive, or evidence
that the effect of the law is to insulate the state from the effects of
invasive species to the detriment of other states. This is significantly
[i]n the absence of any action taken by Congress on the
subject-matter, it is well settled that a state, in the exer-
cise of its police power, may establish quarantines against
human beings, or animals, or plants, the coming in of
which may expose inhabitants, or the stock, or the trees,
plants, or growing crops to disease, injury, or destruction,
even though affecting interstate commerce.
Id.
145. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
146. See 33 CONG. REC. 4871 (1900) (discussing the threat that
several nonnative species pose to the nation as a whole).
147. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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different from the test articulated in Taylor and the quarantine cases
in that the burden is on the challenger rather than the state. Under
the test articulated in those cases, the state has the burden of showing
that the law is rationally related to protecting the state from harmful
imports. Though the state need only meet a rational-basis standard,
the burden is nevertheless on the state. 148 Maintaining the burden on
the state might discourage states from enacting more invasive spe-
cies laws for fear of defending a Dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenge.
While protecting laws that effectuate the purpose of the Lacey Act
is important, Courts also need to recognize the importance of the
Dormant Commerce Clause. However slight, there is still a risk that
states might use a less stringent Dormant Commerce Clause test for
SISLAPs to insulate protectionist state laws from Dormant Com-
merce Clause scrutiny. It is true that the challenger would likely
produce evidence of this protectionist purpose, but courts should still
have a mechanism for protecting interstate commerce absent such
evidence. For this reason, courts should continue to require that
SISLAPs be narrowly tailored to further the purpose of the Lacey
Act. This will ensure that states will not abuse the presumption of
validity and that state legislatures will strongly consider the law's
impact on interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION
In sum, courts should recognize the import federal and state role
SISLAPs play in combating invasive species by presuming that they
effectuate the purpose of the Lacey Act. Courts, however, should
also recognize the importance of the free flow of interstate com-
merce by requiring that state legislatures narrowly tailor such laws to
protect against invasive species while burdening interstate commerce
as little as possible. This will result in courts promoting Congress-
man Lacey's lofty goals for the conservation of native wildlife by
encouraging states to enact more laws to protect against invasive
species and the federal government to prosecute violations of these
laws under the Lacey Act more frequently.
148. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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